Justine Jacot
Lund University, Department of Philosophy & Cognitive Science, Graduate Student
- Theory of Conventions, David K Lewis, Relevance Theory, Philosophy Of Language, Game Theory, Semantics/Pragmatics, and 13 moreFormal Epistemology, Logic, Pragmatics, Epistemic Logic, Independence-Friendly (IF) Logic, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Problem solving (Cognitive Psychology), Decision And Game Theory, Signaling Games, Interrogative Model of Inquiry, Wason Selection Task, Formal Philosophy, and Languages and Linguisticsedit
- According to Donald Davidson, linguistic competence and performance are a matter of interpretation and adjustment and... moreAccording to Donald Davidson, linguistic competence and performance are a matter of interpretation and adjustment and are not, as David Lewis thought, a matter of learned and applied conventions. My aim is to show that one can bring together both of these conceptions of language, with, as a starting point, lewisian signaling games and classical game theory. We will see that one can express signaling situations, typical of game situations where information is incomplete, in Independence Friendly Logic. Then I will develop a new kind of signaling games, interpretative adjusting games, in which signaling situations are to be expressed as coordination games between several agents whose task is to reach an adequate adjustment of their respective theories on the meaning intentions of each speaker. Those games, inspired by the evolutionary game-theoretic framework, allow to show how agents learn strategies and manage to refine their mutual adjustments in order to reach equilibrium.edit
This paper outlines how classical propositional logic, particularly the notion of ‘obtaining a classically-valid logical proof’, can be understood as the outcome of an argumentation-game. We adopt two game-rules from dialogical logic... more
This paper outlines how classical propositional logic, particularly the notion of ‘obtaining a classically-valid logical proof’, can be understood as the outcome of an argumentation-game. We adopt two game-rules from dialogical logic under which obtaining such as proof is a matter of due course, as both rules together guarantee a winning-strategy for one player when logical consequence holds. We then show how these rules can arise from players’ preferences, rather than be imposed externally, and can hence count as ‘player self-imposable’. Subsequently, this game is shown to comply with the Pragma-dialectical Code of Conduct, while some of the Code’s rules become gratuitous as their content arises directly from player’s preferences instead. Our discussion is oriented towards future inquiries into how logics other than its classical variant can be similarly “naturalized.”
