- Professor of Cognitive Scienceedit
The paper deals with how constraints on conceptual representations evolve through processes of knowledge shar- ing. We describe pragmatic settings of referential communication and provide a model of how names, nouns and adjectives emerge... more
The paper deals with how constraints on conceptual representations evolve through processes of knowledge shar- ing. We describe pragmatic settings of referential communication and provide a model of how names, nouns and adjectives emerge through a process of abstraction. In situations of referential communication, the contrast class - the set that intended referents must be distinguished from - is important for determining the degree of specification of referential utter- ances. Two processing strategies involving contrast classes are proposed that are connected to the nominal and adjectival levels of abstraction. Certain cognitive representational skills are needed to be able to assess a contrast class in a commu- nicative situation. We propose three communicative strategies that correspond to different assessments of the relevant con- trast class.
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... Auteur : GARDENFORS Peter. Prix indicatif 34,50 €. Disponible chez l'éditeur (délai d'approvisionnement : 10 jours). Ajouter au panier Ajouter au panier le livre de GARDENFORSPeter. Date de parution : 10-2003 Langue :... more
... Auteur : GARDENFORS Peter. Prix indicatif 34,50 €. Disponible chez l'éditeur (délai d'approvisionnement : 10 jours). Ajouter au panier Ajouter au panier le livre de GARDENFORSPeter. Date de parution : 10-2003 Langue : ANGLAIS 200p. 23.4x15.6 Hardback. ...
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The dominating models of information processes have been based on symbolic representations of information and knowledge. During the last decades, a variety of non- symbolic models have been proposed as superior. The prime examples of... more
The dominating models of information processes have been based on symbolic representations of information and knowledge. During the last decades, a variety of non- symbolic models have been proposed as superior. The prime examples of models within the non-symbolic approach are neural networks. However, to a large extent they lack a higher- level theory of representation. In this paper, conceptual
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First MIT Press paperback edition, 2004 © 2000 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any elec- tronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or... more
First MIT Press paperback edition, 2004 © 2000 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any elec- tronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without ...
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This article contains comments on the other papers in this volume. I take up the roles of the world, the mind and the society in my semantic theory. I show how semantic differences between languages can be seen as attending to different... more
This article contains comments on the other papers in this volume. I take up the roles of the world, the mind and the society in my semantic theory. I show how semantic differences between languages can be seen as attending to different parts of event structures. The role of the emotion domain in relation to the meaning of pejoratives is discussed. Finally, the idea that articles in language should be seen as an extension of pointing is shown to be congenial with my theory of semantics based on conceptual spaces.
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Abstract This article proposes,an ecologically,based answer,to why,humans,are the only animals,who,have developed,a
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By understanding laws of nature as geometrical rather than linguistic entities, this paper addresses how to describe theory structures and how to evaluate their continuity. Relying on conceptual spaces as a modelling tool, we focus on the... more
By understanding laws of nature as geometrical rather than linguistic entities, this paper addresses how to describe theory structures and how to evaluate their continuity. Relying on conceptual spaces as a modelling tool, we focus on the conceptual framework an empirical theory presupposes, thus obtain a geometrical representation of a theory's structure. We stress the relevance of measurement procedures in separating conceptual from empirical structures. This lets our understanding of scientific laws come closer to scientific practice, and avoids a widely recognized deficit in current philosophy of science accounts, namely to risk a collapse of the physical into the mathematical.
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This paper offers a novel way of reconstructing conceptual change in empirical theories. Changes occur in terms of the structure of the dimensions—that is to say, the conceptual spaces—underlying the conceptual framework within which a... more
This paper offers a novel way of reconstructing conceptual change in empirical theories. Changes occur in terms of the structure of the dimensions—that is to say, the conceptual spaces—underlying the conceptual framework within which a given theory is formulated. Five types of changes are identified: (1) addition or deletion of special laws, (2) change in scale or metric, (3) change in the importance of dimensions, (4) change in the separability of dimensions, and (5) addition or deletion of dimensions. Given this classification, the conceptual development of empirical theories becomes more gradual and rationalizable. Only the most extreme type—replacement of dimensions—comes close to a revolution. The five types are exemplified and applied in a case study on the development within physics from the original Newtonian mechanics to special relativity theory.
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There is a great deal of justified concern about continuity through scientific theory change. Our thesis is that, particularly in physics, such continuity can be appropriately captured at the level of conceptual frameworks (the level... more
There is a great deal of justified concern about continuity through scientific theory change. Our thesis is that, particularly in physics, such continuity can be appropriately captured at the level of conceptual frameworks (the level above the theories themselves) using conceptual space models. Indeed, we contend that the conceptual spaces of three of our most important physical theories—Classical Mechanics (CM), Special Relativity Theory (SRT), and Quantum Mechanics (QM)—have already been so modelled as phase-spaces. Working with their phase-space formulations, one can trace the conceptual changes and continuities in transitioning from CM to QM, and from CM to SRT. By offering a revised severity-ordering of changes that conceptual frameworks can undergo, we provide reasons to doubt the commonly held view that SRT is conceptually closer to CM than QM is.
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This article outlines how conceptual spaces theory applies to modeling changes of scientific frameworks when these are treated as spatial structures rather than as linguistic entities. The theory is briefly introduced and five types of... more
This article outlines how conceptual spaces theory applies to modeling changes of scientific frameworks when these are treated as spatial structures rather than as linguistic entities. The theory is briefly introduced and five types of changes are presented. It is then contrasted with Michael Friedman’s neo-Kantian account that seeks to render Kuhn’s “paradigm shift” as a communicatively rational historical event of conceptual development in the sciences. Like Friedman, we refer to the transition from Newtonian to relativistic mechanics as an example of “deep conceptual change.” But we take the communicative rationality of radical conceptual change to be available prior to the philosophical meta-paradigms that Friedman deems indispensable for this purpose.
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Our aim in this article is to show how the theory of conceptual spaces can be useful in describing diachronic changes to conceptual frameworks, and thus useful in understanding conceptual change in the empirical sciences. We also compare... more
Our aim in this article is to show how the theory of conceptual spaces can be useful in describing diachronic changes to conceptual frameworks, and thus useful in understanding conceptual change in the empirical sciences. We also compare the conceptual space approach to Moulines’s typology of intertheoretical relations in the structuralist tradition. Unlike structuralist reconstructions, those based on conceptual spaces yield a natural way of modeling the changes of a conceptual framework, including noncumulative changes, by tracing the changes to the dimensions that reconstitute a conceptual framework. As a consequence, the incommensurability of empirical theories need not be viewed as a matter of conceptual representation.